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Shooting yourself in the foot
with due care: psychotherapists
and crystallized standards
of tort liability
BY ROBERT F. SCHOPP, PH.D., J.D., PH.D.
AND DAVID B. WEXLER, J.D.

This paper discusses a conceptual tension that arisesfrom the
attempt to regulate the fiduciary therapeuticrelationship through
the law of negligence. This tension becomes particularly
problematic when courts adopt crystallized duties as per se rules
or as presumptive standardsof care for psychotherapists. Under
certain conditions, this tension can undermine the therapeutic
process, the fiduciary nature of the therapeuticrelationship, and
the process by which professionalorganizationspromulgate
guidelinesfor their members. Thus, under certain circumstances,
regulation through negligence law may frustrate both therapeutic
and legal purposes. This papersuggests steps that courts and
professionalorganizationscan take to minimize the insidious
effects of this tension, but it does not contend that these steps
will resolve all of the difficulties associated with tort regulation
of psychotherapy.

Professional organizations sometimes promulgate guidelines
intended to inform their members' practice. These standards
may be designed to guide practitioners under ordinary condiAUTHORS' NOTE: We are grateful to BarbaraHannan and Robert D.
Millerfor helpful comments on earlierdrafts of thispaper.
© 1990 by FederalLegal Publications,Inc.
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tions, or they may define an ideal toward which to strive. If
courts adopt idealized standards as criteria of responsible
practice for the purpose of establishing tort liability, professional organizations might respond by refraining from developing such guidelines or by framing them with an eye toward
preventing liability rather than strictly for the purpose of
enhancing patient care. In either case, the courts' actions and
the organizations' responses might hinder, rather than
enhance, the therapeutic project of the mental health system.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is an approach to the study of
mental health law that investigates the effects of the law on
the therapeutic project of the mental health system and
considers ways in which the law might be designed in order to
promote that project without sacrificing other important
values. One important item on this agenda is the study of
various ways in which legal rules, procedures, or roles may
actively impair the functioning of the mental health system.'
This paper considers one aspect of tort law that may undermine both the therapeutic project of the mental health system
and the legal goals that the law is designed to promote.
Negligence law is intended to serve at least two purposes.
First, it provides compensation to those who suffer injury as
a result of unreasonably risky conduct by others; second, it
promotes reasonable care by actors who engage in potentially
dangerous conduct. It is intended to promote reasonable care
by shifting the cost of loss due to unreasonably risky
behavior to the actor, thus motivating actors to avoid such
unreasonable conduct. An actor is found liable for negligent
behavior when that actor causes injury to another by virtue
of his failure to exercise the care of a hypothetical reasonable
person in the same or similar circumstances. When the action
in question involves the practice of a profession, the actor
must act with the care and competence of an ordinary
2
competent practitioner of that profession.

Unfortunately, courts must evaluate behavior, consider standards of care, and make negligence determinations retrospectively. Professionals, including clinicians, must practice their
professions in a manner that they consider responsible and
hope that if injury occurs, courts and juries will agree
retrospectively with their prospective evaluation of reasonable care. This prospect is particularly troublesome in light of
the literature suggesting the substantial effect of hindsight
bias. Judges and juries must decide whether certain decisions
and actions by practitioners were reasonable under the
circumstances that prevailed when the clinicians decided and
acted. However, judges and juries make these determinations
with knowledge of the eventual results of the clinicians'
action, while the clinicians decided to engage in their conduct
without the benefit of such information. The literature
suggests that a court's knowledge about the results of the
conduct in question may substantially affect its evaluation of
the action's reasonableness, although the practitioner
selected the course of action without access to such information.3
Legal institutions could address the hindsight bias through
both procedural and substantive steps. Procedurally, for
example, expert witnesses might testify during the malpractice trial about the existence and robustness of the hindsight
bias and about debiasing techniques. Such testimony would
be intended to educate the jury about the bias and, hopefully,
to influence them toward less biased decision-making.4 Alternately, the judge might inform the jury about the bias and
about debiasing techniques through jury instructions.5 Some
have even suggested that courts bifurcate malpractice proceedings, requiring that the jury determine the negligence
issue before receiving information regarding the outcome of
the clinician's decision for the purpose of evaluating proximately caused harm and damages.6

SHOOTING YOURSELF IN THE FOOT

In addition to these procedural measures, courts and professional organizations might jointly address the hindsight bias
by establishing relatively predictable substantive standards of
professional practice. Courts could adopt crystallized standards of due care for negligence purposes such that a
practitioner could predict that certain practices would be
accepted as reasonable under certain circumstances. Alternately, courts could adopt presumptive standards that would
enable the clinician to predict that conduct conforming to
those standards would raise a presumption of due care,
placing the burden on the other party to override this
presumption. Either alternative might reasonably be
expected to enable the practitioner to predict with some
confidence a court's conception of due care and, thus, to
conform to that standard.
Consider, for example, the administration of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). A recent study indicates that administration of ECT in Massachusetts varies widely from guidelines
published by a task force of the American Psychiatric
7
Association but that malpractice suits in this area are rare.
Courts might attempt to establish consistent standards of
care in this area by adopting the task force's recommendations as crystallized rules of due care for malpractice, accepting evidence that ECT had been administered contrary to
guidelines regarding age, diagnosis, or procedure as conclusive or presumptive evidence of malpractice. Conversely,
conformity with the guidelines would establish due care.
Such a practice by the courts would probably promote both
consistency of practice and predictability regarding liability
for practitioners.
This paper will examine several areas of mental health law in
which some relatively crystallized standards have developed.
It will argue that: (1) the appropriate role of crystallized
standards of negligence in the tort regulation of clinical
practice is quite limited and (2) the application of negligence
law to mental health practitioners, and possibly to the

members of several other professions, raises a fundamental
tension that pervades the entire enterprise and, under certain
conditions, renders the process self-defeating.
The argument will proceed in the following manner. Section I
will briefly review the relevant principles of negligence law
and identify some areas of mental health law in which
relatively crystallized standards have begun to develop. Section II will examine three difficulties encountered when
negligence law is applied to psychotherapy, and it will
explicate the fundamental tension that underlies them. Section III will discuss the ramifications of these issues for tort
regulation of psychotherapy, with particular attention to the
appropriate role of crystallized standards. Finally, section IV
will briefly summarize the conclusions and recommendations
of the paper.'
1. Negligence and crystallized duties

A. Principles
of negligence

The law of torts regulates ordinary social activity by distributing the cost of such activity according to certain social
goals, policies, and conceptions of fault. Negligence law
shifts the cost of injury suffered as a result of human action
from the victim to the actor when that injury results from a
lack of reasonable care on the part of the actor. In establishing standards of due care, the courts balance the plaintiff's
interest in compensation for loss, the defendant's interest in
engaging in the type of activity involved, and society's
interest in promoting productive activities while regulating
risks.9 Thus, the court applies a cost-benefit analysis to the
type of activity in question, balancing the social benefit in
encouraging such activity against the social cost it produces. 0
In setting the standard of care for a particular type of
conduct, courts attempt to guide the behavior of future
actors through the process of stare decisis. Each case contributes to a body of precedent that informs future courts of the
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appropriate standard to apply. Thus, future actors are
expected to guide their behavior according to the standards
of reasonableness established by previous cases." If a particular type of activity produces relatively little social benefit at
the cost of great risk, then a reasonable person would be
expected to engage in that activity with great care, if at all. In
contrast, a highly productive activity that creates relatively
little risk does not require similar vigilance to prevent injury.
The usual standard of care for negligence cases is that of the
ordinary prudent person under the same or similar circumstances, where the circumstances are evaluated in terms of
the risk-benefit analysis described above.' 2 That is, the actor
is held to the degree of care that the ordinary prudent person
would exercise in light of the risks and benefits involved.
However, if an individual possesses, or claims to possess,
superior skill or knowledge, the courts apply an elevated
standard. Members of a profession, therefore, must perform
with the ordinary care and competence (OCC) of a member
in good standing of that profession.' 3
The application of this OCC standard to particular cases
generally requires expert testimony to establish the appropriate practice according to accepted professional standards of
care under circumstances similar to those which occurred in
these cases. This process requires that the courts engage in
case-by-case retrospective evaluations of the professionals'
conduct in the circumstances. This produces uncertainty in
practice, as the clinical decision must be made before the
court determines what conduct it will accept as reasonable in
this particular situation. This uncertainty is particularly
4
problematic in light of the dangers of hindsight bias.'
Under certain conditions, relatively fixed rules of liability
regarding identified types of professional practice can crystallize in the law of negligence. Trial courts may treat
appellate decisions that describe certain conduct as clearly
negligent, as clearly not negligent, or as falling within the

scope of jury evaluation as establishing rules of reasonable
conduct for that type of activity."s For example, the Supreme
Court of Washington has established a per se standard of
negligence for ophthalmologists who fail to administer a
pressure test for glaucoma.'" Courts may also interpret
statutes that require or prohibit certain kinds of conduct as
establishing standards of reasonable behavior for negligence
cases. Criminal or regulatory statutes, for example, might
require or forbid particular types of activity. Courts may
treat violations of these statutes as negligence per se, as
presumptive evidence of negligence, or merely as relevant
evidence regarding the appropriate standard of care. 7 When
rules of reasonable care crystallize into relatively fixed standards of negligence per se or presumptive negligence, actors
may be able to select with more confidence behavior that will
constitute due care.
* Crystallized
duties and
clinicians

Some crystallized duties apply to professionals generally,
including mental health clinicians. These include the following duties: to maintain competence regarding new developments in the field; to decline a case or responsibility for
which the practitioner is not qualified; and to refer to an
expert or specialist when such a referral is called for. In
addition, certain behavior by members of a particular profession may become established as negligence per se. For
example, the surgeon who closes an incision without removing all surgical implements or the attorney who fails to file an
action within the statute of limitations may be held to have
violated a per se standard of care."
Some crystallized duties that are specifically directed toward
mental health clinicians have also begun to develop. In one
case, the court ruled that non-expert testimony that a therapist had physically beaten the patient established a prima
facie case of malpractice that did not require any additional
evidence regarding the standard of care in the profession."
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At least one commentator contends that courts will generally
accept physical invasion of the patient as improper practice
per se.20 Other commentators have concluded that courts will
likely hold that sexual relationships between clinicians and
their patients are per se violations of the therapist's duty to
the patient.2'
While the crystallized duties described above elicit relatively
little dissent, the Tarasoffcourt's "duty to protect" has been
much more controversial. In Tarasoff, the court found the
therapists liable for failing to warn their patient's victim that
the patient presented a threat to her safety.2 The court did
not merely find that this particular failure to warn was
negligent under the circumstances. Rather, the court articulated a crystallized duty to protect potential victims when the
therapist determines or should have determined that the
patient presents a danger to others. The therapist's duty
"may call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely
to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to
take whatever steps are reasonably necessary under the

circumstances. "13
On the surface, the Tarasoff holding may not appear to
constitute a crystallized standard because the court articulated a duty to take any appropriate steps to protect potential
victims. Two factors render it prudent, however, for any
therapist in a Tarasoff jurisdiction to interpret the case as
establishing a crystallized duty to warn.? First, the court
specified that this duty applies when there is an identified or
readily identifiable victim.? Plausible protective steps such as
increasing the frequency of therapy, focusing therapeutic
efforts on defusing the patient's anger, reviewing medication, or notifying the police do not, however, require an
identifiable victim. The requirement of an identifiable victim
seems to make sense only if the duty is understood as a duty
to warn. Second, the Tarasoff therapists took other steps,
including the court's recommended one of notifying police,
to prevent harm. However, the court found the therapists

liable, despite these steps, for failing to warn. The prudent
therapist would conclude from these two factors that protective steps other than warnings will be accepted as adequate to
meet the standard of care only if they are successful. For
these reasons, this paper will treat the Tarasoffstandard as a
crystallized duty to warn.?
While the Tarasoff case established a crystallized duty
through an appellate court decision directly addressing the
appropriate standard of care for negligence, courts can also
establish relatively crystallized standards of care in decisions
that do not directly address clinician negligence. In Wyatt v.
Stickney, the court entered consent decrees establishing
standards of care for adequate treatment and habilitation of
the mentally ill and retarded in Alabama state institutions.2
The standards of adequate treatment for the mentally ill
prohibit treatment plans that include work that is part of
hospital maintenance unless the patient is paid at minimum
wage.? The standards of adequate habilitation of the mentally retarded allow behavior modification programs that
employ aversive stimuli only with the consent of both the
patient and the guardian.? Similarly, in Rogers v. Okin the
trial court ruled that patients can be forcibly medicated or
secluded only when failure to do so would result in physical
harm to the patient, other patients, or the staff?
In each of these cases, courts established standards of
adequate care for certain types of circumstances. If future
courts accept these findings as establishing either per se or
presumptive criteria of due care for the purpose of malpractice, then clinicians can guide their clinical practice according
to these standards with some confidence that doing so
protects them from malpractice judgments. Under these
circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that clinicians who
are aware of these decisions will treat them as rules or
guidelines for practice.

SHOOTING YOURSELF IN THE FOOT

While the Rogers trial court set specific criteria for involuntary medication or seclusion, the appellate court rejected this
approach. It ruled that medication can be forcibly administered only after balancing the need to prevent violence
against possible harm to the patient, but it placed the
responsibility for evaluating each situation in the hands of
qualified physicians. 3 ' This decision leaves the clinician considerable latitude to exercise independent judgment, but it
provides less predictable guidance than would a finding
establishing an explicit criterion. In Youngberg v. Romeo,
the Supreme Court adopted an approach to clinical seclusion
or restraint decisions that grants considerable deference to
professional judgment:
iT]he decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid;
liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional
is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person2
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.
When viewed in isolation, decisions that defer to professional
judgment regarding appropriate care appear to leave clinicians with greater latitude in their treatment decisions at the
expense of predictability regarding criteria of liability. Court
decisions that defer to professional judgment may actually
establish relatively crystallized duties, however, if courts also
accept published professional standards or guidelines as
establishing appropriate clinical judgment. In some areas,
for example, courts have relied heavily on standards published by professional organizations regarding staffing or
psychological testing to establish criteria of acceptable professional judgment.33
When courts defer to professional judgment regarding
appropriate practice but accept the guidelines published by
professional organizations as definitive of responsible professional judgment, then these guidelines can effectively
establish crystallized standards of due care for members of
the profession. Professional organizations, and their legal

consultants, have recognized the legally protective function
that professional standards and guidelines can serve: "Of
course, the drafting of standards may help codify good
clinical practice. If standards are promulgated and followed,
the mere act of following them should, under Romeo's
'presumptive validity' test, go a long way toward insulating
professionals from legal liability." 3' These organizations also
recognize, however, that such standards-and courts' deference to them-can serve as a double-edged sword: "The
other side of the coin, however, is that if written standards
are viewed as an embodiment of accepted professional
judgment rather than as an embodiment of how practice may
operate under ideal conditions, a professional's substantial
departure from the standards. . . may pave the way toward
possible liability.""
In summary, courts can independently create relatively crystallized standards of care for malpractice liability-directly
by articulating specific duties in malpractice cases, or indirectly by setting standards of acceptable care for institutions.
Alternately, courts can establish crystallized duties by adopting standards promulgated by professional organizations as
definitive of reasonable care. If courts then consistently
apply these standards in malpractice cases, they have effectively established crystallized duties.
One can understand various approaches to malpractice litigation as occurring along a continuum of crystallization. At the
crystallized pole stand the fully crystallized duties. Violations
of these standards constitute negligence per se. Physical
invasions, sexual relationships, and the Tarasoff duty to
warn arguably stand at or near this pole. The traditional
OCC standard constitutes the opposite end of the continuum. At this pole, standards of due care under the circumstances are established by professional testimony in each
case. Decisions that accept professional guidelines as relevant
evidence regarding the standard of care would fall along the
continuum according to the weight granted to those guide-
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lines. If a court accepted such guidelines as presumptive
evidence of due care (or failure to exercise due care), then it
would fall relatively near the crystallized pole.
Approaches that fall near the crystallized pole leave relatively
little room for professional judgment in clinical practice, but
they provide clinicians with more predictability regarding
tort liability. In contrast, the OCC standard allows greater
latitude for judgment at the expense of less predictability.
Arguably, clinicians would be better able to protect themselves from unexpected liability if courts were to establish
more crystallized duties or if professional organizations
published clear guidelines for clinical practice and courts
accepted these publications as presumptive standards of due
care. Such crystallized duties are problematic for at least
three reasons, however, when they are applied to clinical
practice.
I!. Crystallized duties and mental health practice
A. Conflicts One of the general purposes of tort law is to encourage
of interest people to behave in a manner that protects the interests of
others. When negligence law is applied to driving, for
example, it is intended partially to encourage drivers to drive
with reasonable care, and thus to protect other motorists and
pedestrians from unreasonable risk. When applied to clinical
practice, negligence law is intended to encourage professionals to practice in a manner that protects and promotes the
interests of their clients and the public. While the law of
professional negligence directs the professional's attention
toward the interests of his clients and the public, it does so
indirectly. That is, negligence law attaches liability to certain
types of conduct in order to motivate the practitioner to
refrain from engaging in that behavior by rendering such
conduct contrary to his own self-interest. The behaviorguiding purpose of tort law rests on the implicit premise that
courts can generally attach liability to conduct in such a

manner as to cause the potential tortfeasor's interests to
converge with the interests of others. By holding defendants
liable for behavior that creates unreasonable risks for others,
courts attempt to motivate actors through appeal to their
self-interest to act in a manner that protects the interests of
others.
Crystallized duties set a prospective standard of care for a
general class of situations. Given this crystallized duty, it is in
the clinician's interest to conform to it in any situation that
falls within the scope of that class. For example, if courts
adopt a standard of care that categorizes sexual relationships
with patients as malpractice per se, then it is in the clinician's
interest to refrain from sexual relationships with any patient.
As long as the conduct required by the crystallized duty is
consistent with the interests of the patient or the public,
negligence law promotes its intended purpose. If particular
circumstances arise, however, in which the conduct required
by the per se rule does not promote the interests of the client
or the public, then the implicit premise of negligence fails. In
these cases, the crystallized standard causes the interests of
the clinician to diverge from those of the client or the public.
There are at least two ways in which such a divergence can
motivate a clinician to act in a manner contrary to the
purpose that the standard was designed to promote. First,
cases might arise in which the crystallized duty applies, and
the clinician can best protect himself from liability by
conforming to that standard despite his judgment that doing
so will not promote the interests of his patient or the
community. Consider the following hypothetical cases.
Smith is a 55-year-old widower. Prior to his first hospitalization
approximately two and one-half years ago, he had received periodic
outpatient treatment for anxiety and depression, but he had
worked consistently as a heating and air conditioning repair man.
He had not suffered major psychopathology or required inpatient
care. His wife died three years ago, and a few months after her
death Smith was hospitalized for treatment of a major depressive
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disorder with suicidal ideation and markedly increased anxiety. His
depression and anxiety improved significantly within six months of
hospitalization, and discharge planning began at that time.
Several planned placements in group homes and boarding houses
have been canceled, however, because Smith experienced exacerbated anxiety as the discharge became imminent. This anxiety
appears to be a direct result of his need to return to work when
discharged and his fear that he has lost his technical skills. Smith
and the treatment team agree that Smith would benefit most from a
period during which he would work for the hospital maintenance
department in order to improve his confidence by practicing his old
skills. Although all parties agree that by doing so Smith would
provide a service for which the hospital usually pays employees,
both union contracts and budgetary constraints preclude paying
Smith for such work. Smith would welcome the opportunity to
work without compensation, but writing and administering such a
treatment program would violate the Wyatt standard. 36 The psychologist's interest in avoiding liability seems to diverge from
Smith's interest.
Jones is a 20-year-old moderately retarded resident of the state
hospital. She has an extended history of episodic assaultive and
self-injurious behavior. The latter usually takes the form of severe
head-banging in response to situations in which others fail to meet
her demands. Consequently she has developed extensive scar tissue
on her forehead, and each additional episode results in further
lacerations. Various nursing care plans and programs of differential reinforcement have proved unsuccessful in eliminating this
behavior.
One night following an episode of head-banging the nurse discovered that the ward had expended its supply of the usual antiseptic and so was forced to cleanse the self-inflicted wounds with
alcohol. Jones clearly found this quite unpleasant and refrained
from head-banging for several days thereafter. When she resumed
head-banging, several staff members suggested a revised behaviormodification plan combining the differential reinforcement
approach with an aversive element consisting of cleansing the
wounds with alcohol immediately after an episode of head-banging. Although there seemed to be good reason to think that the plan
would reduce the head-banging, both Jones and her guardian
refused to consent to the plan.

All members of the team agree that this plan presents the best hope
of altering the self-injurious behavior, but employing it without
permission from both Jones and the guardian violates the Wyatt
standard. 3 Again, the clinician's interests in avoiding potential
liability diverge from the patient's interests-the patient would
benefit from the program, but the psychologist believes he can best
protect himself from liability by refraining from writing such a
program.
Brown, an outpatient at a community mental health center, attends
weekly therapy because of periodic episodes of anxiety and depression and his life-long inability to maintain a job or a relationship.
Recently he has spoken of another patron at a neighborhood bar
who has insulted and pushed him. This week Brown states, "But
now I got some brass knuckles, so if he pushes me again, I'll cave
his face in." When the therapist suggests that she might have to
warn the potential victim, Brown pounds his fist on the table,
yelling, "If you ever tell anyone I come here, I'll never come
back." The therapist believes from past experience with Brown that
she can best serve his interests and those of the public by maintaining therapeutic contact, calming him down, and talking him into
leaving the weapon at home, but she also believes that she can best
avoid liability under Tarasoff3' by warning the potential victim.
The Smith, Jones, and Brown cases all exhibit a common
structure. In each case, a clinician encounters circumstances
in which the interests of his patient and the community
diverge from his own, and this divergence is a product of a
crystallized legal standard that defines his potential liability,
at least as he understands it, in a manner that conflicts with
his patient's interests or those of the community. The
clinicians in these cases believe that they can best protect
themselves from liability under these standards by practicing
in a manner other than that which would promote the
interests of their patients or of society.
Some evidence indicates that this response to conflict
between legal standards and patients' interests is not merely
hypothetical. Several states have responded to the Wyatt
conditions on patient work by eliminating all patient work
programs in state institutions." At least one commentator
reports that legal regulations and court orders regarding
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electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) in public hospitals have led
many clinicians and hospitals to abandon this mode of
treatment, even when it is clinically indicated. These data
suggest that regulation has produced a two-tiered system of
care in which ECT is available to voluntary patients in
private hospitals but unavailable to poor patients who receive
care at public facilities that have abandoned the procedure in
order to avoid liability.40 While it is conceivable that these
public institutions have decided that work programs and
ECT are never in the best interests of their patients, it seems
much more likely that they have abandoned these treatment
modalities in order to avoid legal liability under crystallized
standards.
The second way in which this divergence of interests can
motivate clinicians to protect themselves through conduct
contrary to the purpose of the negligence standard involves
avoidance of the potentially troublesome circumstances in
which the crystallized duty is likely to arise. A therapist in an
outpatient clinic, for example, might take steps to avoid
hearing threats, such as those uttered by Brown, that would
give rise to the duty to warn. She might generally avoid
patients who seem angry as well as those with a history of
violence. Alternately, she might subtly discourage patients
from revealing information that would give rise to the duty
by explaining at the outset of her initial interview with each
new patient that she would have to notify police or others if
the patient says he is going to do anything dangerous.
Such information-avoiding behavior would not even have to
be intentional. The therapist who believes that any threat will
legally obligate him to issue a warning might find that
prospect so disturbing that his response to verbalizations of
anger might unintentionally discourage such revelations.
Suppose, for example, that a therapist who responded with
careful attention and empathy to most patient communications became apprehensive and, consequently, less empathetic as soon as the patient began to verbalize anger. Such a

response might distort the therapeutic process in such a way
as to preclude sufficient disclosure to give notice of the
danger, and thus of the duty.
Behavior-modification programs involving aversive stimuli
are most often appropriate with severely regressed or
retarded patients who engage in injurious behavior that is
resistant to other forms of treatment. A clinician can avoid
the type of potential conflict that arises in the Jones case by
refusing to work in programs that treat such patients. Thus
clinicians might best avoid these potential conflicts by avoiding just those patients and clinical settings that one would
ordinarily think are most important to the public interest.
It is tempting to respond to these cases by reminding the
therapists described above that any clinician who abandons
his responsibility to his patients in order to protect his own
interests is violating his most fundamental duty. The clinician
accepted the responsibility to give priority to his patients'
interests when he entered the profession, and therefore he has
no business acting to protect his own interests when these
conflict with those of a patient.
While this may well be a legitimate response for many parties
to advance, it is a difficult one for the legal system to sustain.
The legal system employs the law of tort for the specific
purpose of motivating clinicians through appeal to their selfinterest. It would be odd indeed for the legal system to
criticize clinicians for responding to the legal system in the
very manner that the system is designed to enforce. This
irony introduces the second and perhaps most fundamental
difficulty produced by crystallized negligence standards for
clinical practice.
The fundamental
tension

The previous section contends that crystallized standards of
care can promote undesirable conduct under certain circumstances. Those who are familiar with tort law will not be
surprised by this claim, but some might argue that crystal-
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lized duties remain justified if they generally promote socially
beneficial behavior in the long run. This section identifies,
however, a more fundamental tension in the attempt to
enforce clinical practice through negligence law.
Certain professional relationships are fiduciary ones, and
those who engage in these professions incur a fiduciary duty
to their clients. Among health care professions, the fiduciary
duty has been most frequently and forcefully articulated
regarding physicians, but it also applies to other clinicians."
A fiduciary is "a person having a duty, created by his
undertaking, to act primarily for another's benefit in matters
connected with such undertaking."4 The fiduciary must
pursue this undertaking solely for the benefit of the other,
disregarding his own interests. The fiduciary must also avoid
placing himself in a position in which his personal interests or
those of third parties might conflict with those of the person
to whom he owes the fiduciary duty. 3 Fiduciary relationships
include "those informal relations which exist wherever one
man trusts in or relies upon another. One founded on trust or
confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity
of another. . . the relation can be legal, social, domestic, or
merely personal.'"
In summary, the fiduciary duty arises when one person trusts
in or relies upon another's integrity or fidelity and hence
becomes dependent upon or vulnerable to the other's performance. The clinician's fiduciary duty is a product of the
patient's trust in and dependence upon the clinician's skill
and care. The duty requires that the practitioner pursue the
clinical relationship solely for the best interests of the patient,
without regard for his own interests.4s The cases described
above, in which crystallized standards of care create a
conflict between the clinician's interests in avoiding liability
and the interests of the patient, are ones in which tort law
exerts pressure on the clinician to act in a manner that is
contraryto this fiduciary duty. Under these conditions, the
substantive law imposes on the clinician a fiduciary duty to

consider only his patient's interests, and it actively creates an
incentive structure that promotes violations of that duty.
These cases reflect the fundamental tension that pervades the
entire enterprise of enforcing appropriate clinical practice
through tort. Negligence law attempts to guide behavior by
structuring liability in a manner that motivates actors to
conform to reasonable standards of care by appeal to their
self-interest. The fiduciary duty requires that the clinician
ignore self-interest and act purely for the patient's interest.
When the law attempts to reinforce the fiduciary relationship
through tort liability, it attempts to motivate the practitioner,
through appeal to his self-interest, in such a manner as to
prevent him from responding to appeals to his self-interest.
That is, the law directs the clinician not to respond to that set
of influences that includes this very legal directive. In effect,
the court says to the clinician, "Do not attend to that class of
considerations that includes this one."
This tension creates the following dilemma: (1) Negligence
law attempts to protect and reinforce the fiduciary relationship by directing the clinician's conduct in that relationship
through appeals to his self-interest. (2) Either the clinician
responds to this directive or he does not. (3) If the practitioner does not respond to the law's directive, then it cannot
protect or reinforce the fiduciary relationship. (4) If the
clinician does respond to the law's directive, then the law has
successfully directed the clinician's attention to his own selfinterest, thus undermining the fiduciary relationship. Therefore the law's directive either fails to protect and reinforce
the fiduciary relationship or it actively undermines it. In
short, attempts to protect or reinforce the fiduciary relationship between clinician and patient through tort liability are
46
inherently self-defeating.
While this dilemma pervades the entire enterprise of enforcing the therapeutic relationship through negligence liability,
it takes a harmless form under most circumstances. Under
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ordinary conditions, sentence (3) will apply, in that the
practitioner will not respond to the influence of tort law
because no indicators of unusual tort liability will arise. The
practitioner will simply practice in an ordinary competent
manner without considering tort liability because no circumstances suggest that potential liability is imminent. In these
conditions, negligence law will not actively protect or reinforce the fiduciary relationship, but that fact will be harmless
because such reinforcement will be unnecessary. The
dilemma takes on a more malignant form, however, when
sentence (4) applies. When the clinician's tort-driven interests
as defined by a crystallized standard diverge from the
patient's interests and the clinician conforms to the crystallized standard in order to avoid liability, then negligence law
actively undermines the fiduciary relationship it is intended
to reinforce.
Many circumstances can produce conflicts between the fiduciary's duty and his self-interest. It is important to recognize,
however, that the type of conflict described in this paper is
created by the law that is intended to protect and reinforce
the fiduciary relationship. This tension may arise for practitioners of any profession that involves a fiduciary relationship. The nature of psychotherapy may render it particularly
problematic, however, for mental health clinicians. Because
of the importance of the therapeutic relationship to the
therapeutic process, apprehension regarding tort liability
may undermine the fiduciary relationship between patient
and therapist even in cases in which the therapist does not act
in a manner contrary to the patient's interests.
C. Psychotherapy and
crystallized
standards
of care

Outcome research increasingly supports the contention that
psychotherapy produces statistically significant and clinically
meaningful improvements for patients. These positive results
tend to last and to exceed the effects of placebo or pseudotherapy control groups. Although certain theoretical
approaches secure superior effects for specific types of
problems under certain conditions, no particular school of

therapy is consistently superior to the competitors. The
therapist-patient relationshipplays a central role in successful therapy. Mutual acceptance and trust characterize effective therapeutic relationships . 7 Therapist credibility and
trustworthiness contribute significantly to the positive outcome of successful therapy. Effective therapy occurs when
the patient and the therapist perceive each other as being on
the same "wavelength"-when the therapist and the patient
share a mutual perception of understanding and trust.
Patients improve as a result of therapeutic relationships in
which they perceive an interest in and endorsement of their
4
well-being.
In summary, psychotherapy is generally effective, and the
quality of the therapeutic relationship contributes significantly to success. Effective therapeutic relationships are
characterized by mutual trust and acceptance as well as by
the patient's perception that the therapist cares about and
pursues the patient's interests. It is reasonable to expect,
then, that any disruption of this relationship impairs the
effectiveness of therapy. Notice that the effective therapeutic
relationship has certain qualities in common with the fiduciary relationship. Trust and a primary concern for the
patient's well-being are central to both. This suggests that
any influence that disrupts the fiduciary relationship would
also impair the therapeutic relationship and therefore the
effectiveness of the therapy.
Two plausible assumptions can be made about mental health
practitioners. First, most are basically honest and responsible. They generally attempt to fulfill their responsibilities,
and they realize that this involves pursuing the best interests
of their clients. Hence, they usually practice their profession
in a manner intended to promote their patients' well-being.
Second, few are heroic. Although they generally pursue their
patients' interests, they will probably not do so at the cost of
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absorbing substantial personal harm or risk.
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Given these two assumptions, most clinicians will pursue the
therapeutic relationship in a manner that will promote effective therapy and fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities under
most conditions. They wil not do so, however, at the cost of
substantial personal cost, including the risk of tort liability.
That is, concern about tort liability can undermine the
ordinary clinician's devotion to both the fiduciary duty and
the therapeutic project when conflicts occur between the
standard of care for tort liability and the conduct likely to
promote effective therapy. If tort liability sometimes undermines the fiduciary relationship in the manner suggested, and
if the relationship carries the significance for effective therapy that it apparently does, then tort liability probably also
impairs effective therapy. In such cases, tort liability will
undermine the very process it is intended to promote. This
effect is not necessarily limited to those cases in which the
therapist actually sacrifices the patient's interests to protect
himself from tort liability. If the clinician is sufficiently
concerned about tort liability to conduct the therapeutic
relationship with a wary eye toward protecting his own
interests regarding liability, that attitude may be sufficient to
dilute the therapist's apparent trustworthiness and concern
for the patient's welfare and thus to undermine the therapeutic relationship.
Ill. Discussion and recommendations
At first glance, these arguments may seem to generate the
intuitively implausible claim that no one should ever be held
liable in tort for violating a fiduciary duty. This does not'
follow, however; these arguments identify a tension rather
than a contradiction inherent in the attempt to protect and
reinforce fiduciary relationships through tort liability. This
tension does not infect all cases.

It may be helpful to think of the person charged with a
fiduciary duty as making decisions relevant to that responsibility at two levels of generality-the specific level and the
strategic level. At the specific level, the fiduciary must make
choices that directly affect the interests of the party whose
well-being he is charged with protecting. For example, a
guardian may have to decide whether to approve surgery for
an incompetent ward; a trustee may have to decide whether
to invest the beneficiary's funds; or the clinician may have to
decide whether to write a treatment plan for Smith that
includes unpaid labor in the hospital.
In some cases, however, the fiduciary's interests may conflict
with those of the beneficiary at this specific level. Suppose,
for example, that a trustee badly needs a loan to avoid the
collapse of his own business, while his incompetent ward
would benefit most from a safe long-term investment. In
such a case, the trustee's self-interest motivates him to lend
the ward's funds to his own business, while his fiduciary duty
demands that he invest those funds in some safer long-term
alternative. The law requires that fiduciaries resolve such
conflicts of interest at the specific level in favor of their
beneficiaries, and it enforces this requirement by holding
liable in tort fiduciaries who advance their own interests at
the expense of their beneficiaries. By doing so, the law
attempts to motivate fiduciaries through appeal to their selfinterest at the more general strategic level. At this strategic
level, fiduciaries adopt an attitude or decision-making strategy for decisions at the specific level. By imposing tort
liability on those fiduciaries who attend to their own interests
at the level of the specific decision, the law can manipulate
the interests of fiduciaries at the more general strategic level
in such a manner as to motivate them to adopt a general
strategy of ignoring their self-interest when they make specific decisions. By attaching liability to self-regarding
decision-making strategies, the law causes the fiduciary's
interests to converge with those of the beneficiary, because
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the fiduciary can promote both the beneficiary's interests and
his own by making specific decisions without regard for his
own interests.
While this convergence of the clinician's interests with those
of the patient obtains in principle, it holds in practice only if
one makes an additional assumption. Interests converge in
this manner only if courts' retrospective determinations of
ordinary care and competence usually coincide at least
roughly with clinicians' prospective judgments. That is,
clinicians will be well advised to forgo considerations of selfinterest at the level of specific clinical decisions only if they
have reason to believe that the actions they take on this basis
will generally receive retrospective approval by courts applying the same standard. If, however, practitioners believe that
court determinations of malpractice are determined primarily
by hindsight bias, client or bar litigiousness, perceptions of
deep pockets, or any additional factor other than their own
due care, then tort liability does not motivate them to adopt
the strategy of ignoring their own interests at the level of
specific decisions. Rather, it motivates them to adopt the
strategy that they deem most likely to protect them from
whatever factors they believe to be determinative of court
decisions.
We assume for the sake of argument that courts' retrospective evaluations of due care generally correspond at least
roughly to clinicians' prospective judgments of responsible
practice. This assumption does not deny the possibility of
substantial divergence between the criteria applied by clinicians and those applied by courts. Significant disparity may
result from factors such as the effects of hindsight bias,
particular fact patterns, or differences in error preferences.
We assume only that the criteria of due care applied by courts
and clinicians correspond to a degree sufficient to render it
prudent for most clinicians to adopt the general strategy of
making most specific clinical decisions with their attention
directed primarily toward their clients' interests."

Insofar as this assumption applies, the law can reinforce the
fiduciary duty through appeal to the fiduciary's self-interest
without contradiction, because the fiduciary is required to
forgo self-interest at the specific level and the behaviorguiding influence of potential tort liability appeals to the
fiduciary's self-interest at the more general strategic level.'
This approach remains viable, however, only so long as the
traditional OCC standard is applied. Only with the OCC
standard and this third assumption can the clinician protect
his own interest regarding tort liability by disregarding it and
conducting his clinical practice in a manner intended to
further the interests of his patients.
Serious conflicts can arise for clinicians, however, when the
law departs from the OCC standard and establishes crystallized standards for tort liability at the level of specific clinical
decision. Then the clinician cannot confidently protect himself by disregarding self-interest in favor of client interest
when making specific decisions. The practitioner who directs
his attention solely to the patient's welfare might make
decisions that violate crystallized tort duties and hence his
own legally engendered interest in avoiding liability. If the
law adopts crystallized standards of care, the prudent clinician cannot safely set aside his own interests and pursue the
fiduciary duty with confidence that careful attention to the
fiduciary responsibilities will also protect his own interests.
When the law adopts crystallized standards, the practitioner
must choose one of two general strategies. First, he can adopt
the heroic course, ignoring the potential threat to his own
interests and pursuing the fiduciary duty at his own peril.
Second, he can adopt the prudent alternative, practicing his
profession with an ongoing vigilance toward his own interests, pursuing his clients' welfare whenever he can do so
without placing himself at serious risk, but sacrificing a
patient's interests (or those of the community) when doing so
fulfills crystallized duties. Given the assumption that most
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clinicians are responsible but not heroic, it is reasonable to
expect many clinicians to take the prudent course.
The prudent course generates the dangers described in section
II in that clinicians may take action to protect themselves at
the expense of their patients. Alternately, the mere fact that
clinicians are practicing with a wary eye toward liability may
dilute the therapeutic relationship in a manner that impairs
therapeutic effectiveness. As discussed previously, the legal
system should be very hesitant to criticize any clinician who
attends to his self-interest in these circumstances, because the
clinician would be responding to legal standards specifically
designed to motivate the practitioner by appeals to his selfinterest. For the legal system to criticize the clinician under
these conditions would be for the law to berate the practitioner for failing to heroically resist the pressures created by
the law itself.
The argument advanced thus far suggests that if one assumes
that most clinicians are responsible but not heroic and that
they have good reason to think that court determinations of
negligence will coincide at least relatively well with their own
judgments of good practice, then (1) courts can enforce the
practitioner's fiduciary duty through tort liability without
contradiction, provided that they apply the traditional OCC
standard, and (2) crystallized duties create a fundamental
tension that renders that enforcement project inherently selfdefeating.
Does our opposition to crystallized duties force us to accept
the counter-intuitive proposition that courts should not treat
physical assault of the patient by the therapist as per se
improper?n Recall the underlying problem: tort law is a legal
institution employed to protect and reinforce the fiduciary
relationship, but it can combine with crystallized standards
of care to undermine that relationship. Certain conduct by
clinicians, however, demonstrates that those practitioners
have already lost sight of or abandoned the fiduciary rela-

tionship. If conduct, such as assault, is such that it cannot
plausibly fall within the scope of responsible clinical practice,
then a crystallized standard that precludes it will apply only
when the fiduciary relationship has already been lost. The
arguments presented above are predicated on the commonplace assumption that most clinicians are honestly motivated
and responsible, not on the implausible assumption that all
are. Crystallized duties that are limited to conduct noncontroversially beyond the scope of responsible practice do
not undermine the fiduciary relationship, because they apply
only when such a relationship does not exist. The responsible
clinician can safely ignore these crystallized standards and
pursue the therapeutic project for the benefit of the patient
with confidence that he is not putting himself at risk.
These arguments therefore support the conclusion that tort
liability based on the traditional OCC standard, possibly
supplemented with crystallized duties that apply only to
conduct that clearly falls beyond the pale of responsible
practice, is consistent with the legal purpose of promoting
and reinforcing.the fiduciary therapeutic relationship. Crystallized duties that do not clearly fall beyond the scope of
responsible practice in all cases, however, undermine the
fiduciary relationship they are intended to protect.
Some critics might accept these arguments as applied to per
se rules but contend that duties such as the Tarasoff duty to
warn or the Wyatt standards regarding work or behavior
modification should be accepted as presumptive evidence of
malpractice. These critics might argue that the courts ought
to treat conduct violating these standards as establishing a
rebuttable presumption of malpractice. The clinician would
then have the opportunity to demonstrate in court that the
conduct violating these standards was justified in that particular case.
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This objection fails, however, because it assumes that clinicians incur substantial losses only when they lose a malpractice action and hence that only the prospect of losing such a
suit will motivate them to turn their attention from their
patients' interests to their own. Clinicians incur substantial
costs, however, when they are sued, and these costs remain
even if the clinician prevails.5 3 Thus, they are motivated to
avoid being sued.
Clinicians can reasonably expect plaintiff's attorneys to be
more willing to bring suit merely on the basis of a violation of
a standard if that violation raises a rebuttable presumption of
malpractice, shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant, than they would if that violation did not raise the
presumption and therefore left the burden on the plaintiff.
Given this expectation and clinicians' motivation to avoid
being sued, accepting violations of standards as presumptive
of fault generates the tension between clinicians' fiduciary
duty and their self-interest as defined by the standard. In
circumstances in which clinicians believe that violating the
standard would promote their patients' interests, the
patients' interests support violations of the standard, but the
practitioners' tort-driven interests support conformity.
Consider the ramifications of these conclusions for
professional organizations as they publish guidelines for
professional practice. Establishing guidelines and recommendations for professional practice seems to be an ordinary and
even expected function of professional organizations. If
these organizations publish such recommendations, however,
and find that their guidelines are used to support crystallized
duties that their members are then held liable for transgressing, then they may become understandably hesitant to
advance such guidelines.
The American Psychiatric Association's standards for psychiatric treatment facilities appear to demonstrate this pattern of legally induced professional reticence. In 1958 the

association published recommended staffing standards for
hospitals and clinics that included tables of staffing ratios for
public and private facilities.-' It represented these standards
as requirements for active treatment and humane care."
After the 1966 Rouse v. Cameron court referred to these
standards as evidence supporting a finding of inadequacy in
the treatment provided by some facilities, however, the
association in 1969 published revised standards without the
staffing ratios. The association characterized these revised
standards as relevant to the pursuit of professional excellence
and stated that the tables of staffing ratios were omitted
because it was impossible to set forth meaningful national
7
ratios.1
Professional organizations seem to face the following
dilemma. If they produce recommendations for clinical
practice, they run the risk that courts may turn these into
crystallized rules and use them as criteria of liability in a way
that actually frustrates the practice of the profession and
undermines the fiduciary relationship. If they do not publish
such guidelines, however, they fail to fulfill one of their
ordinary functions, and they leave the courts to establish
standards with no guidance from the profession.
Professional organizations might be tempted to respond to
this dilemma by formulating guidelines for the very purpose
of preempting judicial evaluations of due care by codifying
their self-interest and insulating clinicians from liability.
They might consider establishing guidelines designed to
provide their members with concrete rules that individual
clinicians could use as evidence of due care in the form of
compliance with professional standards. By doing so, these
organizations might effectively establish conventions that
courts would adopt as crystallized and therefore predictable
standards of care, but in doing so they would encounter a
deep tension with their ethical duty to promote professional
practice for the benefit of the patient rather than of the
practitioner. Perhaps the analysis presented in this paper

SHOOTING YOURSELF IN THE FOOT

suggests a more satisfactory method by which professional
organizations can avoid this apparent dilemma.
Conduct that falls categorically outside the bounds of
responsible practice can be identified as such because crystallized duties regarding this type of behavior do not interfere

with competent and careful practice. Professional guidelines
will be most helpful, however, when they address treatment
methods such as the use of restraints, seclusion, or aversive
stimuli, which are controversial but have legitimate applications. Useful guidelines regarding the use of such methods
must be written against certain background assumptions
regarding training, facilities, immediately available alternatives, and clinical indications. Guidelines should make
explicit as many of these assumptions as possible, and they
should indicate that they apply only as general principles that
should be taken into account when these assumptions are
fulfilled. They should also explicitly state that either conformity with these principles or departure from them might
be required for particular clinical circumstances. The clinician, therefore, should consider and document the relevant
reasons for conforming with or for departing from the

guidelines. That is, the mere fact of either conformity or
departure should not raise a presumption of either responsible or irresponsible practice without consideration of the
reasons cited for taking the action in question.
On this understanding, professional guidelines should not
provide concrete rules for practice; rather, they should
explain the relationship between various professional practices and relevant clinical circumstances. Clinical practice
that either conforms to or departs from the guidelines
therefore can be evaluated only by considering the clinician's
reasons for acting in light of the explanations provided by the
guidelines.

Some current professional guidelines conform at least generally to this recommendation. A task force of the American
Psychological Association charged with evaluating ethical
issues in behavior modification rejected fixed standards in
favor of a checklist of issues to be considered by clinicians
designing behavioral interventions. The checklist is intended
to ensure that important issues are considered, not to resolve
them. It raises questions about such issues as consent,
confidentiality, accountability, and the right to terminate a
program, but it does not specify concrete standards for these
considerations."
Similarly, an American Psychiatric Association task force on
seclusion and restraint has identified genleral indicators for
seclusion and restraint in the form of appropriate purposes,
including prevention of harm, protection of property, and
facilitation of treatment. The task force explicitly rejected
rigid regulations, however, and recognized that individual
clinical decisions required familiarity with the specific patient
and circumstances.s This task force, like that of the American Psychological Association, suggested guidelines regarding behavior-modification programs that took the form of
questions to be raised about the specific treatment plan to be
implemented.6
Professional standards developed and presented in this manner could provide one source of relevant evidence in a
malpractice trial, but they would not provide reasonable
grounds for either per se rules or presumptions. In an
analogous setting, one commentator has raised the more
extreme possibility that the law should prohibit any use of
professional standards to establish malpractice liability.6 '
Such a rule might be warranted if it is necessary to insulate
the important professional guideline development process
from infection by worries over legal liabilities. We will not
pursue this proposal in this paper. If courts accepted professional guidelines as relevant evidence, but not as per se or
presumptive rules, practitioners might be encouraged to
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employ them as reflective tools for consideration in difficult
clinical situations, thus informing their clinical practice and
limiting their potential liability.
IV. Conclusions
Tort law is intended partially to motivate people to fulfill a
duty of reasonable care toward others by creating an interest
for the actor that converges with the interests of others.
Under certain circumstances, this purpose of tort law can
create a paradoxical tension in that crystallized duties of care
intended to enforce the fiduciary duty can actually undermine the fiduciary relationship. The potential for this effect
arises whenever the legal system enforces a fiduciary duty
through the mechanism of tort law, but it becomes particularly acute when courts establish crystallized duties as either
per se rules or presumptive standards.
While this tension may interfere with various fiduciary
duties, the problem may be exacerbated for psychotherapists
for the following reason. For some professions and some
fiduciary duties, it might only be important that the fiduciary
act in the best interests of the beneficiary. For example, if an
attorney acts as a trustee for the estate of an incompetent
ward, the purpose of the fiduciary duty may be satisfied so
long as the trustee manages the estate for the best interest of
the ward, regardless of the attorney's motivation for doing
so. However, if the therapeutic relationship plays as important a role in successful psychotherapy as some sources
suggest, it may be important not only that therapists act in
their patients' best interest, but also that they do so out of
concern for their patients' interests. If so, then a legal
institution that enforces the fiduciary duty through appeal to
the fiduciary's self-interest may undermine its own purpose
even if it does not produce actions that frustrate the fiduciary
responsibility.

This analysis suggests the following steps as means of
reducing this paradoxical tension: (1) Although crystallized
standards of liability might be desirable from the point of
view of the practitioner as a means of increasing predictability, courts should generally establish such duties only for
conduct, such as assault, that clearly falls beyond the scope
of responsible practice. (2) In most cases, courts should apply
the traditional OCC standard. (3) Courts should accept
guidelines produced by professional organizations as relevant
evidence regarding malpractice but not as establishing per se
or presumptive rules. (4) Professional organizations generally should not publish concrete rules of practice, but they
should frame guidelines in the form of explanations of the
relationships among various practices and relevant clinical
conditions. They should explicitly recognize that either conformity to or departure from these standards can constitute
responsible practice and that any particular case must be
evaluated in light of the practitioner's reasons for acting.
Apart from indisputably irresponsible practices such as
assault, both professional organizations and courts should
refrain from establishing standards of practice in the form of
concrete professional rules or crystallized legal duties. When
courts establish crystallized standards regarding practices
that do not fall clearly beyond the scope of responsible
practice, they risk two potential pitfalls. First, they may
create a counter-productive standard in that they may discourage clinicians from practicing in their patients' interests
when those clinicians encounter circumstances in which their
patients' needs diverge from the crystallized standard. Second, the courts may encourage professional organizations to
distort their appropriate function by refraining from developing needed guidelines or by formulating professional standards for the purpose of protecting their members from
liability rather than for the purpose of promoting patients'
interests.
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This paper has considered a fundamental tension that pervades the entire enterprise of enforcing the therapeutic
fiduciary relationship through negligence law. While we
advocate primary reliance on the OCC standard rather than
on crystallized rules of liability as the most efficacious
manner of avoiding the insidious effects of this tension, we
do not suggest that the OCC standard resolves all of the
substantial problems with tort regulation of psychotherapy.
Such regulation remains quite troublesome for several reasons.
To the extent that courts rely on the OCC standard, practitioners remain vulnerable to the effects of idiosyncratic
"experts" who are willing to testify regarding "professional
standards" known only to them.6 2 In addition, the OCC
standard does nothing to alleviate the problem described
earlier regarding hindsight bias and the clinician's inability to
predict the court's retrospective determinations of reasonable
care.63 Perhaps courts can correct for the hindsight bias, at
least partially, through procedural rather than substantive
methods. A comprehensive treatment of the tort regulation
of mental health practitioners would extend well beyond the
scope of a single paper. Our purpose here has been only to
identify and address this tension inherent in the reinforcement of the therapeutic relationship through tort liability.
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